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Preface 
“There can be few fields of human endeavor in which history counts for so little as in 
the world of finance. Past experience, to the extent that it is part of memory at all, is 
dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate 
the incredible wonders of the present.’’ (John Kenneth Galbraith, Α Short History of 
Financial Euphoria, 1990). 
Abstract 
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The dissertation attempts to analyze the transformation of the US banking industry 
during the period 1970-2018. Initially, a comprehensive literature review focuses on 
the impact of events that acted as catalysts for the transformation of the US Banking 
industry, namely Deregulation, Recession, and Dodd-Frank Act. Furthermore, the 
Determinants of US banking profitability are investigated across the period of 1999-
2018. The sample is comprised of 118 US Listed Bank Holding Companies with more 
than 10 billion in Assets. The study is conducted through panel data regression using a 
fixed-effects model with entity and time effects. The model incorporates Bank-specific, 
Industry-specific, and Macroeconomic variables. The main results suggest that the 
profitability of large US banks is influenced by Capital Strength, Credit Risk, 
Diversification, and Productivity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
During the last 50 years, the US Banking system has undergone significant 
transformation as a result of major political, social, and technological circumstances. 
After 1980, the credit system experienced structural transformation due to changes in 
regulation, demand, and technology (Rajan, 2006). As a consequence, the competition 
in the conventional lending ecosystem intensified, and the role of intermediation 
weakened. The new status quo urged banks to develop new ways of efficiently 
diversifying and boosting their profits. Equilibrium and deregulation affected the 
income statement of banks. Banks transitioned from interest-income to non-interest 
income. (Albertazzi and Gambacorta,2006) 
 
The overdependence on interest margins forced banks to alter their conventional 
practices and pursue more aggressive tactics of generating profits such as trading, 
underwriting of securities, and securitization. These strategies of non-interest income 
took off as they coincided with the increased desire of retail and corporate customers 
to access and invest in financial markets (Albertazzi and Gambacorta,2006). 
 However, increased interconnectedness in financial markets and the high degree of 
globalization intensified competition and reduced margins. In particular, financial 
innovation and regulation constitute the most critical aspects that contributed to 
transmogrifying the banking industry. 
 
 In regards to regulation, as the US Federal government provided a “carte blanche” to 
banks to diversify their activities in tandem, the industry was directed towards 
significant consolidation. Ideologies such as “government is the problem,” “financial 
modernization” and “Efficient Market Hypothesis” drove financial regulation (Crotty, 
2009). Those ideologies established a new consensus in which the inevitability of 
financial innovation, the self-correcting nature of markets, and the pursuit of best 
interest were perceived as beneficial for the overall economy. However, as time 
progressed, this consensus was rebutted, and the core underlying problems were 
exposed. 
   
The US Recession of 2008 that constitutes perhaps one of the most important events 
of the 21st century, uncovered those problems. The Recession kicked off in December 
2007 and finished in June 2009. It is considered as the most severe economic and 
financial meltdown since the Great Depression of 1929. The root causes of the US 
recession pertain to lax credit conditions, weak and fraudulent underwriting practices 
extensive deregulation (Stiglitz, 2010), financial innovation and complexity (Crotty 
2009,) incorrect pricing of risk, (Stiglitz, 2010) overleveraging (Cabral,2010) and 
commodities boom. All these aspects essentially paved the way for the reinforcement 
of the Shadow Banking system and the growth of the Housing Bubble. In turn, 
subprime and predatory lending practices were allowed to become the norm leading 
inevitably to a systemic crisis (Palley, 2010).  
 
Despite the structural problems of technical nature, the root causes of the Recession 
were also found to be associated with behavioral elements. Specifically, deregulation, 
unsupervised financial innovation, and a protracted period of loose expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy (Verick and Islam,2010) cultivated a dangerous culture in 
the financial industry (Rajan, 2006). This culture was characterized by perverse risk-
taking incentives (Rajan, 2006) with the aim of generating exorbitant profits. However, 
both the banking industry and the government were victims of multiple behavioral 
biases such as: “moral hazard” (Stiglitz, 2010) “herding,” “wishful thinking,” 
“groupthink,” “representativeness heuristic,” “anchoring,” “informational cascade” 
and “time is different.” 
 
The outbreak of the crisis resulted in significant widespread political, economic, and 
social implications whose effects are still echoing today. The Recession of 2008 led to 
massive losses, failures of prominent financial institutions, and broad destabilization of 
the global economy. The severity of the impact forced many states across the world to 
initiate responsive procedures to prevent the global financial system from collapsing. 
Unprecedented fiscal and monetary measures were employed to refuel the financial 
system through various stimuli and to restart growth. In order to countervail the 
impact of the crisis and avoid systemic collapse, the governments employed several 
measures.  
   
The regulatory bodies subsidized troubled institutions with massive capital injections, 
introduced sharp drops in interest rates, and provided fiscal stimulus packages. In the 
aftermath of the Recession, international trade, stock and commodity markets 
experienced significant drops combined with rising unemployment. Furthermore, the 
consequences of the Recession led to business retrenchments, decline of 
consumption, and long-term growth. Consequently, the crisis spread across the world 
through a contagion effect that led to the European sovereign debt crisis and affected 
the economy of Asia significantly. The Recession of 2008 was unanticipated worldwide 
by policymakers, agencies, academics, and investors. It proved that the degree of 
diversification, interconnectedness, and innovation present in financial markets 
rendered the process of regulation extremely cumbersome. 
 
Primarily, the scale of diversified activities, the depth and the complexity of innovation 
in financial markets and institutions created great regulatory confusion and 
inefficiency. Subsequently, governing bodies focused on the imposition of stringent 
regulatory frameworks in the financial sector to prevent the recurrence of similar 
phenomena in the future. In this context, the task of regulatory oversight had been 
arduous due to the overlap of jurisdictions between multilateral involved agencies.  
 
The new regulatory framework materialized with the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that 
focused on thorough oversight, reinforced capital adequacy, frequent stress testing, 
and macro-prudential regulation. The persistence of stagnating growth, along with the 
limitations and gaps of the current regulation, have led numerous experts worldwide 
to doubt the impact and efficiency of the Dodd-Frank Act. The widespread disbelief 
towards the ability of the system to reduce global systemic risk along with many of the 
incentives and complexities that contributed to the devastating Recession of 2008 are 
still evident. 
 
 
   
1.2. Motivation  
 The aftermath of the global crisis established a new ethos regarding the operation of 
financial markets and the management of economies. The severity of the crisis set in 
motion a fundamental shift in the banks’ culture coupled with widespread de-risking 
and deleveraging. Although significant progress has been made on developing 
effective processes that deal with bank failures, especially when they are large, the 
market structure that emerged from the financial crisis involves significantly larger 
institutions, particularly U.S.-based ones. The large got massive, and the small banks 
got more complicated. 
  
Moreover, compared to 10 years ago, the policy flexibility and the tools that 
governments and institutions can use to confront a new financial crisis are greatly 
diminished. Interest rates are being at much lower levels than in 2009, the U.S., central 
banks’ balance sheets are already large, and debt levels are significantly fickle and 
higher than before the global financial crisis. Deterioration in long-run growth 
potential and depressed productivity growth are still evident.  Additionally, the global 
political polarization and the shift of economic power from the West to the East were 
direct results of the crisis. All these aspects compose a dangerous and ominous blend 
of dynamics that maximize the possibility of a reemerging financial crisis. 
1.3. Aim and Objectives  
Taking into account the context above, this dissertation aims to investigate the 
transformation of the US Banking industry in the period under consideration (1970-
2019). This dissertation focuses geographically on the US Banking sector due to its 
importance for the global economy. The motivation and rationale for this choice stem 
from the USA’s leading role in the global economy. The US economy is considered the 
largest in the world; The US dollar is the primary international trade and reserve 
currency and drives “dollarization.” Most importantly, the country is at the forefront of 
technological development and is especially dominant in service-industries, such as 
financial services, information technology, healthcare, and retail. In particular, the USA 
is considered the financial center of the world due to the size and interconnectedness 
of its financial markets.  
   
Thus, considering the dependence of the global economy on the USA, it can be 
constructive to examine the development and status quo of its financial sector 
holistically. 
 
The period under consideration (1970-2019) has been chosen to explore the impact of 
catalyst events and changes that USA experienced after 1970. Three critical and 
distinct phases have reshaped the world of finance and in sequence, the global 
economy. Namely, “Deregulation, Recession of 2008 and Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act” constitute those three phases. Provided that 
these 3 phases consist of events that are complex and multifactorial, the literature is 
quite extensive and relatively ambiguous as there are no ultimately definitive 
conclusions that cast light on the causality and impact of these events. Furthermore, 
these events have profound implications of political, social, and economic nature. 
Despite the paramount importance of these events for the global economy, 
professionals are divided and express conflicting views for the effects of those 
catalysts until today. 
 
Retrospectively, in order to achieve the aims mentioned above, the following 
objectives have been set. First, a collection of the extant literature has been carried 
out. An effort has been made to synthesize the majority of relevant material in a 
comprehensive and coherent narrative. This narrative focuses on the assessment of 
the changes that Deregulation, Recession, and Dodd-Frank Act brought upon the US 
Banking industry. The lens of the literature review combines historical and economic 
perspectives. Second, multiple graphs have been developed and examined that shed 
light on the evolution of key US economic and banking metrics across the period under 
consideration. Third, an econometric model based on the extant literature is applied to 
the major US banking institutions that emerged from the crisis in an attempt to 
investigate the current Determinants of Banking profitability. The originality of each 
part will be analyzed briefly in the respective sections. 
 
 
   
1.4. Research questions 
Ultimately, this dissertation attempts to provide answers to the following research 
questions: First, how the period of Deregulation during 1970-1999 led to a large scale 
transformation of the US Banking industry? Second, which were the root causes of the 
Recession of 2008, and how these affected the US banking sector and the economy 
and resulted in regulatory changes? Third, was the major financial overhaul of banking 
regulation through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act effective in addressing 
problems in the banking industry and future Recession concerns? Finally, in the 
aftermath of the Recession and the Dodd-Frank Act, which are the current 
determinants of profitability for large US banks?  
1.5.  Structure of the Dissertation 
The Dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
Deregulation, Recession, and Dodd-Frank Act. Section 3 refers to the data 
methodology describing sampling, econometric model, variables, and limitations. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results along with Descriptive statistics, Correlation 
Matrix, and Robustness tests. Finally, Section 5 summarizes conclusions. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Structure and Approach 
 
 The approach of this literature to presenting the foundation of prior knowledge for 
these topics is twofold. This approach incorporates in tandem standpoints of view 
from political economy and economics.  
The first part examines the onset and the effects of US financial deregulation from 
1970 to 1999. More specifically, the historical context, the transformation of the US 
banking industry, and the effects of deregulation on risk-taking, compensation, and 
growth will be analyzed briefly. The second part explores the root causes and 
ramifications of the recession of 2008. The third part investigates the effectiveness of 
the Dodd-Frank Act as a regulatory response to the financial crisis of 2008. 
   
2.2. Deregulation of the US Banking industry (1970-1999) 
Zhang (2017) initially describes the historical origins of Deregulation in the US banking 
industry. He reports that at first, the United States government regulated banks to 
avail itself of tax revenue for public finance. Consequently, states were aiming to 
reduce competition to gain tax monopoly funds leading to the creation of the so-called 
‘’Unit banking states”. During the start of the 20th century, regulation of the banking 
sector evolved into a conflict of political ideology between small community banks of 
rural areas and large banks of urban cities. The rural banks had entrenched their 
positions in the local markets and were preponderant institutions with substantial 
monopoly rights. The lobbying influence of these rural banks attenuated the 
expansionary activities of large banks through the enactment of the McFadden act of 
1927 that effectively prohibited interstate branching and restricted intrastate 
branching. 
  
Large urban banks tried to exploit a loophole of the Act by creating Bank Holding 
Companies to bypass restrictions and propagate into other states via acquisitions. 
Eventually, Congress enacted the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956. The Act provided the option to every state to confine Bank Holding 
Companies from buying or acquiring banks in other states. All states exercised the 
option, thus forestalling Bank Holding Companie’s ability to perform Interstate 
acquisitions without consent of the target firm and both states involved in the 
transaction. A part of The Saint Germain Act in 1982 amended the Bank Holding 
Company act of 1956 and allowed any Bank Holding Companies to acquire failed banks 
and thrifts without taking into consideration state laws.  
 
The beginning of widespread deregulation can be traced to 1978 when the state of 
Maine revoked restrictions on interstate branching followed by Alaska and New York in 
1982, which in turn created a domino effect. In 1994 the enactment of the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act repealed the Douglas Amendment and 
gave carte blanche in Bank Holding Companies’ to engage in interstate acquisitions and 
subsidiary mergers.  
   
Zhang (2017) states that the wave of interstate and intrastate branching that followed 
deregulation was mainly executed via mergers and acquisitions and not via de novo 
branching. He bases the explanation for this choice on the rationale that creating a 
new branch involves incurring fixed costs to capture a reduced market share, whereas 
an acquisition is easier and gives banks access to a bigger market share. Moreover, 
Zhang (2017) attempts to explore the reasons that instigated this wave of 
deregulation. 
 
First, he states that technological developments altered how banks engaged customers 
and conducted business. He refers to ATM technology that closed the distance gap and 
rendered branches somewhat redundant. The author expands this argument by 
highlighting that the “personal” element of relationships between banks and 
customers relatively dissipated. Banks started engaging in investment banking 
activities such as stocks, bonds, derivatives, and advisory services that did not require 
that close relationship. Second, Zhang (2017) points out that demographics in terms of 
the urbanization of American society wound down the lobbying force and primacy of 
once well-established community banks. 
 
Another reason was associated with the global position of US banks. Because of the 
geographic restrictions, US Banks were smaller compared to foreign competitors, and 
as the latter initiated large-scale expansionary activities in the US, the issue came into 
the political spotlight, stressing the need to render US Banks more competitive. Finally, 
Zhang brings up the fact that the worrisome number of failures across undiversified 
small banks exacerbated the systemic threat to the US economy, thus precipitating the 
need for deregulation to amplify the strength of the Banking system. 
Moving into the practical part of this paper, the author finds that Deregulation, on the 
one hand, brought about an increase in economic growth at the state level. As credit 
supply sources became more diverse and banking markets more integrated, these 
changes facilitated the access of smaller firms to funds, as a result, loans and 
investments rose to engender higher growth. Zhang (2017) argues that as the 
interconnectedness of markets heightened, a tradeoff was created between regional 
growth and systemic risk depending on shocks being “idiosyncratic, state-specific or 
widespread systemic.”  
   
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) examine the relationship between bank 
ownership structure and risk-taking. They argue that stockholder controlled banks 
provide stock option compensation to executives to induce higher risk-taking than risk-
averse managerially controlled banks. Furthermore, in periods of deregulation, this 
difference in risk-taking levels is becoming more acute, effectuating the need for 
supervision. 
 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) examine the effect of interstate banking deregulation on 
executive pay structure through the lens of the Managerial Talent Hypothesis. The 
Managerial Talent Hypothesis states that highly competitive markets require highly 
skilled and talented Executives; therefore, a high level of compensation is required to 
attract these executives. Consequently, the pressure to perform is conducive to higher 
turnover rates.  
In this context, they examine how the levels of different types of CEO compensation, 
such as bonuses, salary, options, and equity ownership changed after Deregulation. 
They account for the factor of size to observe whether faster-growing banks attract 
CEOs with higher levels of compensation. The authors find strong evidence in line with 
the Managerial Talent Hypothesis showing that higher compensation, performance-
based compensation, and executive turnover rates are more evident in deregulatory 
environments. They also find evidence that the size of banks positively influences the 
level of compensation. 
 
Bechera, Campbell, and Fryec (2003) state that as a response to deregulation, 
intensified competition, and opportunity, banks started offering more equity-based 
compensation that generated better performance and growth without excessive risk. 
The new deregulatory environment set in motion changes in governance structure and 
internal monitoring to align management -shareholders’ incentives. Chen, Steiner, and 
Whyte (2006) report that the widespread establishment of stock option-based 
compensation can raise the risk-taking levels of banks and in reverse risk impacts 
compensation structure. As a result, the authors underpin that regulatory supervision 
of the compensation structure is crucial.  
 
   
Belkhir and Chazi (2010) find that the shareholders of prominent Bank Holding 
Companies that are active in deregulatory environments offer their CEO stock options 
sensitive to risk to avoid risk-averse behaviors and proliferate risk-taking incentives. 
Consequently, the sensitivity of stock options to equity risk influences the CEO’s 
decisions, which, in turn, determines the overall level of bank risk. Berger et al. (1995), 
analyze the transformation of the US Banking Industry throughout 1979-1994. To 
begin with, they report that this transformation is evident through many factors such 
as the reduction of banking organizations; the high level of failures; the development 
of Off-balance sheet activities; the emergence of foreign lending to US Corporations; 
the introduction of ATMs; a weakening bargaining power over depositors and the 
subsequent higher cost of funds; the reinforcement of equity capital;  the repeal of 
interstate restrictions that ratcheted up interstate expansion and the decline of 
commercial and industrial lending. 
 
The authors attribute these changes firstly to extensive deregulation that urged banks 
to raise capital and expand and secondly to innovative developments in applied 
finance and technology such as information processing, telecommunications, 
securitization, and derivatives. Moreover, the authors highlight that the Banking 
industry experienced significant growth in size in terms of assets, deposits, and loans, 
which in turn offset the decline of market share emanating from rising competition. 
 
In combination with the argument as mentioned above, the authors pinpoint that the 
consolidation of the banking industry affected bank lending significantly redirecting 
the flow of funds from smaller to larger firms driven by a diseconomy of scales effect.  
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that less capitalized banks are more likely to be 
acquired. Also, branching deregulation can reinforce the diversification and resilience 
of banks to idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, they report that inefficiency causes failures 
and discourages acquisitions. Jeon and Miller (2001) examine the merger rates of 
banks after interstate and intrastate deregulation. They suggest that most mergers 
occur in intrastate as smaller banks attempt to avoid the threat of interstate 
acquisitions by major banks. Additionally, deregulation creates an uptick in 
concentration. Finally, they support that deregulation affects the level of entries and 
exits in the banking sector.  
   
 
Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that Deregulation started from the 1970s with states 
allowing interstate acquisitions and statewide branching. These changes have resulted 
in multiple entries of banks in new markets and decreased cost and price of services. 
Consequently, the factor of competitiveness in the banking market elevated. 
 
 However, Stiroh and Strahan state that an adjustment period is required to observe 
actual changes in the market share landscape. The primary beneficiaries of these 
changes were the big banks as they experienced an increase of 20% in total assets 
held, climbing from 50% to 70%. More specifically, Stiroh and Strahan report that 
deregulation is contributive to substantial merger activity that enables the exit of 
weaker banks. Additionally, they touch upon the influence of the reallocation of 
market share in an industry, a factor significant for the structure and success of 
banking. 
  
They report that the growth of more efficient firms that claim bigger market shares 
enhances the performance of the industry. The acquisition of weaker firms can boost 
performance as well through the replacement of incompetent management. Mainly, 
deregulation paved the way for branching and not de novo banking since the latter 
requires an extended period to reach efficiency levels. Overall, Deregulation by 
increasing competition led to a reallocation of assets to more profitable banks, which 
in turn made the industry more profitable.  
 
Strahan (2003) argues that Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation improved 
the quality of banking services and lowered their costs. Subsequently, the real 
economy “Main Street” benefitted as economic growth created by new businesses 
accompanied deregulation. Tirtiroglu, Daniels, and E. Tirtiroglou (2005) report that 
regulation negatively affected bank’s productivity, whereas only intrastate 
deregulation had a positive long-term influence on the bank’s productivity growth.  
 
 
 
 
   
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) suggest that competition between banks affects the 
structure of non-financial sectors significantly as the effect can be double-edged. 
Potentially, increased competition can improve access to credit for small firms, 
whereas concentration can limit it. Correa and Suarez (2009) argue that deregulation 
acted as a stabilizing factor for small firms more dependent on external financing. New 
interstate bank entries drove extended access to credit by fortifying the firm’s 
resilience to absorbing idiosyncratic shocks. As short-term credit became less 
procyclical, it lowered the idiosyncratic risk of firms’ stocks thus reduced volatility. 
 
Chava et al. (2013) find that Financial deregulation can boost economic growth by 
empowering the innovation of small firms. However, the nature of deregulation is 
crucial as they observed contrasting effects on innovation between intrastate and 
interstate deregulation. Korinek and Kreamer (2013) find that deregulation triggers 
redistribution effects. On the one hand, deregulation increases risk-taking levels and 
profits of banks with the possibility of significant losses causing severe credit crunches. 
In particular, financial innovation, extremely high compensation, concentration, and 
bailout safety further boost risk-taking. These large excesses directed in the financial 
sector are in detriment of the overall economy.  
 
On the other hand, regulation diminishes intermediation, and availability of credit, 
hampering real economic growth potential. Francis, Hasa, and Wang (2014) support 
the view that increased competition in the banking sector can reduce credit limitations 
of non-banking firms enabling economic development. Zhao and He (2014) argue that 
the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act has increased banks’ systemic risk rather than decreasing 
it. Increased systematic risk creates uncertainty and renders monitoring of Banks 
cumbersome. Additionally, the authors highlight that the existence of multiple 
regulatory bodies can cause disclosure discrepancy. In turn, the interaction between 
multiple institutions can elicit wrong conclusions and obfuscate processes towards 
mutual solutions. Finally, they stress the importance of data integration and the view 
that only accounting information is not sufficient to estimate the overall risk. 
Additional data is needed, such as legal, product and customer datasets.  
   
2.3. US Recession of 2008. Root causes and ramifications  
Rajan (2006) claims that the compensation structure of investment managers is based 
on risk and performance. These two aspects can instigate the pursuit of perverse 
incentives such as tail risk and herding behavior to generate higher returns and justify 
underperformance, respectively. Rajan (2006) continues by analyzing the 
transformation and consolidation of the US banking industry after 1970. The main 
factors that drove change in the financial industry, according to Rajan (2006), were 
information, innovation, and deregulation. 
 
 Rajan (2006) describes that these parameters decreased monitoring, costs, and 
distance of lending. As a result, the consolidation of the sector increased access and 
competition in finance. All these changes augmented overall lending, 
entrepreneurship, and growth. As banks expanded their customer base and underwent 
changes in their processes, their role evolved. Rajan analyzes this change by referring 
to concepts such as “commodification, securitization, specialization, customization, 
and re-intermediation.” Through an extensive analysis of these changes, Rajan (2006) 
concludes that perverse incentives, the monetary policy of low-interest rates, and 
deepened integration of financial markets built up the overall level of systemic risk and 
endangered the global economy. 
 
Acharya and Richardson (2009) attribute Recession of 2008 to banks that reduced their 
capital adequacy buffers by holding securitized mortgages either Off-balance sheet in 
entities such as Conduits (SIVs) or on balance sheet by holding AAA-rated tranches. 
These conditions notably allowed banks to hold less capital and thus increase their 
leverage. The authors state that credit agencies provided AAA ratings for fee-
generating incentives and that Large and Complex Financial Institutions(LCFIs) did not 
use securitization as an instrument to spread risk but to avoid capital adequacy 
regulation. The authors also touch on the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) crisis 
that was precipitated by the use of conduits offering guarantees such as liquidity 
enhancements and in combination with the AAA ratings, allowed banks to engage in 
transactions with money market funds effectively engulfing markets with risk.  
   
Finally, the authors suggest that the rationale behind this highly leveraged position on 
securitized mortgages, pertained to risk-taking incentives of bank’s executives, aiming 
to harness short-term compensation (cash bonuses) and marking to market dynamics. 
 
Crotty (2009) asserts that the root cause of Recession was the so-called “New Financial 
Architecture” (NFA). The author begins by pointing out that the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Neoliberal Economics replaced the theories of Minsky and Keynes.  
The new financial system emanated from a combination of rampant deregulation, 
swift financial innovation, and deep interconnectedness. Specifically, those aspects 
were guided by trailblazing institutions and practices that designed structured financial 
products encompassed by “complexity, opaqueness, illiquidity, and leverage.” Crotty 
supports the view that “perverse incentives” evident in financial institutions and rating 
agencies empowered the pursuit of frivolous high-leverage, high risk, and high return 
strategies. Crotty elaborates on the safeguarding and further pursuit of these 
incentives through on balance and off-balance sheet activities that focused on 
bypassing capital adequacy restrictions to increase profits rather than to distribute the 
risk as they supposed to. 
 
Furthermore, Crotty suggests that complexity rendered pricing and valuation of 
structured financial products cumbersome. In combination, this effect was maximized 
by the complacency and forbearance of regulators that allowed banks to set their risk 
evaluation and capital requirement strategies by employing flawed tools such as Value 
at Risk (VAR) models. In addition, the author reports that the excessive use of OTC 
derivatives and the high interconnectedness in financial markets augmented the 
contagion effect. The author justifies this opinion by underlining the endogenous 
nature of systemic risk, the influence of hedging to liquidity, and the further diffusion 
of risk through advanced derivatives such as CDOs. Lastly, the author stressed out that 
a significant change in asset prices can severely punish excessive leverage and scarcity 
of capital setting off a destructive deleveraging process.  
 
 
 
   
Taylor (2009) cites as reasons for the recession of 2008: the relaxed monetary policy of 
low-interest rates, the preventive focus on liquidity problems rather than counterparty 
risk, the support of US government on Homeownership programs, the engagement of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the MBS market and the complexity of Mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). 
 
Palley (2010) examined the macroeconomic conditions that transmogrified the US 
growth model and gave impetus to the recession. He introduces the emergence of 
Neoliberal Economics through the rise in power of political leaders such as Margaret 
Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980). Palley alludes to the shift from the 
“commitment to full employment” model based on productivity, growth, and wages to 
the “asset and debt price inflation model.” Full employment was rejected on the 
grounds of being inflationary and was replaced by the target of controlling inflation. 
This new model facilitated globalization, enabled the emergence of low-wage foreign 
competitors, and introduced the strategy of off-shoring and outsourcing employment. 
Financial boom and low-cost imports partially caused by financial innovation and 
deregulation, expedited the development of leverage and collateral to reinforce “debt-
financed spending.” Finally, the author emphasizes that specific characteristics were 
apparent in all business cycles after the establishment of this new growth model from 
1980 and onwards. 
 
He cites explicitly “asset price inflation (equities and housing); widening income 
inequality; detachment of wages from productivity growth; rising household and 
corporate debt ratios; rising trade deficits; disinflation or low inflation; and declining 
manufacturing employment.” In particular, he highlights the flawed nature of this 
model by introducing a “triple hemorrhage,” composed of “import spending leak, jobs 
leak via offshore outsourcing and investment spending leak via off-shoring.”  
This triple hemorrhage was based on the new international US economic policy on 
trade deficits, which revolved around the NAFTA agreement of 1994, the dollar policy 
after 1997, and the PNTR of China after 2000. 
 
 
   
Stiglitz (2010) begins by alluding to the importance of regulation, stating that large 
externalities stemming from one banking institution can create systemic risk. Pricing 
and asymmetry of information among market participants cannot reflect the actual 
risk. Moreover, Stiglitz (2010) suggests that the existence of moral hazard based on 
bailout assurance was conducive to the unfettered risk-taking behavior and opacity of 
banks. In addition, Stiglitz (2010) suggests that the ostensible distribution of risk 
through retaining “skin in the game” via off-balance-sheet activities and on balance 
sheet AAA tranches was convincing as banks were regarded global specialists in risk. 
Competition, the threat of substitution, and fee incentives compelled the rating 
agencies to provide the highest ratings to as many banks as possible. As a result, the 
rating agencies abetted incorrect pricing of risk, complexity, and information 
asymmetry in favor of short-term profits.  
 
The author suggests that inter alia perverse incentive structures of bank’s materialized, 
through a combination of financial engineering and creative accounting in aspects that 
were unaddressed by regulation. Finally, the author explains that due to 
“shortsightedness,” the inability to understand risk and lackluster sophistication, 
investors and other market participants did not pose limitations to banks. 
Consequently, banks could exploit this situation by pursuing high alpha and beta 
incentive structures. More importantly, had they not followed the trend of pursuing 
short-term profits for their investors, then their market perception would be weaker. 
The burden of maximizing share value induced the CEOs to follow high leverage 
strategies. 
 
 Cornett et al. (2010) report several reasons for the liquidity crunch. First, they cite that 
banks changed their model of business from “buy to hold” to “originate to distribute.” 
Second, this new model was based on diversified lending through securitization. Third, 
banks weakened their private information collection mechanisms for local markets. 
These changes allowed banks to augment their credit offerings excessively.  
 
 
 
   
Moreover, banks shifted from an “on balance sheet asset transformation model” to 
off-balance sheet activities. In particular, banks engaged in maturity mismatches 
funding long-term illiquid securitized mortgages with short-term commercial paper. 
Those loans were moved off-balance sheet into Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs).  
As this model was based on constant refinancing with commercial paper, banks had to 
provide credit enhancements for safety. When refinancing failed, the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper (ABCP) market collapsed, forcing banks to return those assets on 
their balance sheets. Subsequently, their value declined, and markets started 
questioning the bank’s solvency. The precarious position of banks resulted in trust 
issues between banks themselves freezing the interbank market.  
 
Cornett et al. (2010) find that because of those freezes of interbank, Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper (ABCP) and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) markets, liquidity 
evaporated. Banks with exposure on illiquid securitized assets constrained lending, 
whereas banks with safe forms of financing such as deposits and capital maintained 
their lending ability. The authors conclude that banks exposed to wholesale debt and 
demand from borrowers present higher liquidity risk than banks, which are protected 
by government safety nets in case of depositor outruns.  
 
Cabral (2010) states that “Excessive leverage” and “liquidity risk mismatch between 
assets and liabilities” constituted root causes for the development of the financial 
crisis. Cabral (2010) traces the development of these two parameters in deregulation 
explicitly pointing out to Basel I Capital Accord in 1988 and the reduction of reserve 
requirements by the US Federal Reserve in 1990. The author explains that the Basel I 
Accord enabled banks to include in their balance sheet low-risk-weighted assets that 
required a limited amount of capital to be held.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Consequently, banks could grow their asset base at a more accelerated pace than their 
capital base. In this context of disproportionate growth, excessive leverage could 
render the solvency of banks susceptible to only small losses. The reduction of Reserve 
requirements and the emergence of short-term wholesale funding rendered the 
liquidity structure of banks vulnerable.  Banks inflated their liability side without 
setting aside a sufficient amount of capital and collateral to address deposit growth 
and currency outflows. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that new lending activities 
across many types of loans declined significantly during the crisis. The authors 
associate part of this decline to limited expansionary investments by firms. Moreover, 
the authors highlight a “supply effect” problem. The crisis affected the banking sector 
disproportionally. Not all banks held sufficient liquidity to provide loans, and in cases 
of “lenders switching,” there were apparent trust issues based on inexistent 
precedents of service. 
 
Verick and Islam (2010) claim that the root causes of the Recession pertain to 
extensive deregulation and lax monetary US policy, excessive leverage, and risk-taking 
incentives boosted by off-balance-sheet activities, negligent assessment of risk by 
banks and credit agencies, predatory mortgage lending, the complexity of 
securitization and global exposure to complicated derivative positions. Chor and 
Manova (2012) suggest that limitations on credit conditions and external financing 
forced countries to reduce export flows. In turn, this event was conducive to spillover 
effects of the crisis in international trade. 
 
Rajan (2012) argues that deregulation was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
boosted “entrepreneurship, innovation, efficiency, and competition by widening 
access to credit and decreasing the cost of services.” Rajan (2012) also pinpoints the 
connection between innovation, risk, and compensation structure evident in the new 
business model. On the other hand, it extended income equality as the business model 
shifted towards knowledge work for which the workforce was inadequately prepared. 
Rajan (2012) expands this argument by stating that instead of attempting to address 
the gap between technology and education and upskill lower and middle classes, the 
US government opted for augmentation of credit to stimulate consumption. 
   
Politicians, bankers, and borrowers exploited the low-interest rates policy and 
propelled housing and finance forward, fueling unsustainable debt growth. 
Hansen (2018) reviews Adam Tooze’s book Crashed (2018). Hansen (2018) highlights 
Tooze’s opinion that the Recession of 2008 afflicted international relations, 
governmental policies, and bred nationalist movements across the world. Hansen 
(2018) continues by stressing out another main point of Tooze on the crisis becoming 
global through the high degree of interconnectedness between financial markets. For 
Tooze, the international range of activities of large banks and their short-term funding 
model based on repos and commercial paper caused instability and contagion. Tooze, 
in particular, cites the maturity mismatch of funding long-term illiquid MBSs and CDOs 
with repos and commercial paper. Moreover, Hansen (2018) underlines Tooze’s view 
that the rationale “Finance for Growth,” followed by many US administrations, 
provided legitimacy for the massive deregulation process of the financial industry. 
 
2.4. The Dodd-Frank Act. An assessment of its effects. 
 
Semaan and Drake (2011) indicate that regulation invokes a concomitant reaction in 
which firms learn to adjust and compete, and as a consequence, systemic risk 
decreases, and idiosyncratic risk increases. However, the effect is transient, as in the 
long-term, both levels of risk decrease. Wilmarth Jr (2011) explores the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s benefits and drawbacks. First, Wilmarth argues that the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) is effective in demarcating the boundaries of designation and 
supervision of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Second, Wilmarth 
points out that the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) can impose rigorous capital and 
prudential restrictions on Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  
Moreover, Wilmarth emphasizes the creation of the systemic resolution regime known 
as Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) that can effectively recant the recourse of 
failing Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) to the Federal Reserve to 
invoke bankruptcy reasons. Subsequently, this body can partially stave off bailout 
assurance and “moral hazard,” preserving failing institutions afloat. Finally, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) can reduce systemic risk by assuaging 
the exploitation of consumers by financial products.  
   
Regarding the drawbacks, Wilmarth’s foremost critic is that the Dodd-Frank Act does 
not rectify the Too Big to Fail (TBTF) problem. In particular, Wilmarth claims that 
multiagency oversight and political constraints denigrate the future effectiveness and 
motivation of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Ludwig (2012) claims that the strengths of the Dodd-Frank Act revolve around the 
creation of OFR that acts as an outside onlooker that detects systemic events, the 
establishment of regulations for non-banking institutions and the focus on stress-
testing. On the other side, Ludwig (2012) indicate that the weakness of bodies like the 
Office of Financial Research (OFR) and Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) lie in 
their inherently political nature and stress-testing is dependent on the proper way of 
conducting it. Moreover, Ludwig (2012) suggests that further limitations of Dodd-Frank 
pertain to loopholes that enable regulatory arbitrage, the omission of shadow-banking 
from regulation, excessive regulation, and diminishment of banks’ innovation, 
competitiveness and market knowledge through the prohibition of proprietary trading 
activities. 
Gao, Liao, and Wang (2013) study how the stock and bond markets perceived the 
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act on large financial institutions. During the first 
stage of the passage, they detect that institutions exhibited negative returns in stocks 
and positive returns in bonds. However, during the final stage of the passage, this 
situation reversed. Gao, Liao, and Wang (2013) suggest that regarding the 
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act, markets oscillate between optimism and 
pessimism. Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014) examine the impact of the Dodd-Frank 
Act on the market discipline of banks. They find that the Dodd-Frank Act has enhanced 
market discipline even for large banks. However, the effect of factors such as size and 
Too Big to Fail (TBTF) status for discounts in yield spreads is still active, indicating room 
for further future improvements.  
 
 
 
   
Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang (2014) explore the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on credit 
ratings. They suggest that the legal and regulatory costs of the Dodd-Frank Act have 
forced credit rating agencies to showcase conservatism in terms of accuracy and 
information in their ratings to safeguard their reputation. Akhigbe, Martin, and Whyte 
(2015) present evidence that Dodd-Frank has effectively decreased the risk-taking 
behavior of financial institutions and especially of large institutions with strong 
corporate governance. 
Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2016) investigate the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on US 
bank M&As. Initially, Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2016) suggest that increased 
compliance costs and rigorous capital and prudential requirements potentially 
constitute factors that lead to further consolidation of the banking sector. Next, the 
authors observe a growing number of M&As associated with small banks following the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. They explain that small banks engage in M&As to 
juxtapose the benefits of size to offset the pressure exerted by increased compliance 
costs of the Dodd-Frank Act. More importantly, Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2016) 
demonstrate that small bank M&As develop in hindsight profitability and cost-saving 
dynamics and, consequently, higher returns. 
Hogan and Burns (2019) investigate the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on bank's non-
interest expenses. Hogan and Burns (2019) provide evidence that non-interest 
expenses in small and large banks have increased following the heightened compliance 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. Hughen, Malik, and Daniel Shim (2019) examine 
the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on executive compensation. They find that total 
compensation increases by 21% along with long-term compensation by 101%, whereas 
bonuses decrease by 66%. The results suggest that the increased liability and 
responsibility of executives towards compliance extend the skills required by managers 
and thus the incentives towards higher compensation. 
   
3. Data & Methodology 
3.1. Determinants of US Banking Profitability 
 
The Determinants of Banking profitability constitute an issue that has frequently been 
the subject of the study among academics. The literature is quite extensive, and many 
studies have been conducted to examine the factors that affect banking profitability. 
So far, the studies have mainly focused on European and Emerging Markets. Generally, 
literature converges on banking profitability being determined by internal and external 
determinants. The internal determinants are associated with bank-specific variables id 
est variables relating to bank activities that are influenced by the bank’s executives. In 
regards to external determinants, those include Industry-specific variables id est 
variables that are of social, economic, and legal nature and disturb the operation and 
performance of banks. Lastly, external determinants also consist of macroeconomic 
variables that are uncontrolled by banks.  
 
In terms of profitability measures, the literature mainly converges on three measures 
that of ROA, ROE, and Net Interest Margin (NIM). ROA measures the ability of banks to 
generate profits through their assets whereas ROE measures the return to 
shareholders and in tandem measures the financial leverage. Usually, banks with lower 
leverage showcase higher ROA than ROE and since ROE does not take into account the 
leverage factor that is also subject to regulation, the existing literature considers ROA 
as the dominant measure of banking profitability. Net Interest Margin is another 
profitability measure that tracks how successfully a bank is investing and lending 
compared to the respective expenses. However, this ratio cannot reveal the full picture 
of a bank’s profitability since it excludes non-interest activities. Nonetheless, this 
dissertation will examine all those measures to uncover potential differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
The purpose of this dissertation is to focus on the US Banking industry as it constitutes 
one case that has not been excessively analyzed despite its global financial influence 
and the severity of events that unfolded, such as the Deregulation and the Recession. 
In particular, the determinants of banking profitability have been comprehensively 
examined in the past. However, the impact of Deregulation and Recession of 2008 has 
not been extensively investigated.  
 
Thus, the contribution and originality of this dissertation revolve around two factors. 
First, this study examines the US Banking profitability in a particularly long period of 20 
years (1999-2019). The model utilizes more than 30 variables and 68.000 observations 
to account for as many factors as possible, building on and expanding the work of 
selected papers. At the same time, it investigates profitability during, before, and after 
the crisis accounting for the effects of Deregulation, Recession, and Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
Second, the sample used is exclusively comprised of larger banks to examine 
institutions that hold significant amounts of systemic risk and ergo are of greater 
concern given the structural changes that were introduced in the aftermath of the 
Recession and the enactment of Dodd-Frank Act. Lastly, given that there are studies 
that have analyzed the performance of smaller US Banks after the Dodd-Frank Act, this 
study enables cross-comparisons between banking groups in order to provide a 
complete view of the US Banking sector. To the best of my knowledge, a similar study 
has not been conducted. 
 
This study draws inspiration from and is primarily based on the work of: 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; Staikouras and Wood, 2004; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou 2006; Kosmidou, Tanna and Pasiouras, 2008; Tregenna 2009; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried 2011; PS Hoffmann 2011; Zhang and Dong 2011; Owoputi, Kayode and 
Adeyefa 2014; Adelopo, Lloydking, and Tauringana 2017. 
 
The papers mentioned above provide a thorough and detailed description of many 
topics addressed in this study and can be referred to for additional explanations. 
 
   
3.2. Structure of US Banks. Relevant graphs 
This section will be composed of graphs that showcase the structure evolution of the 
US Banking sector during 1970-2018. Additional detailed graphs for the Structure of 
the US Banks can be found in the Appendix. In order to examine the structure of US 
Banks, it would be constructive to also examine the status quo of the overall US 
Economy during the period of our study (1970-2019).  Thus, a section that contains 
graphs that depict critical economic indicators of the US economy is included in the 
appendix due to its length and to the focus of this section in banks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of Deregulation on the number of banks. First, we can 
observe that in the period under consideration (1980-2019), the total number of 
banking institutions is gradually decreasing, but at the same time, the overall number 
of branches increases. In particular, Deregulation allowed banks to proceed to 
interstate expansion through extensive branching and thus reduced the gap between 
distance and lending. Subsequently, deregulation intensified interbank competition 
and resulted in further consolidation of the sector that created barriers to new entries. 
Figure 1: Number of Banks vs Branches (Source: FDIC) 
   
As a result, the number of banking institutions started to decline over the years 
steadily.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts how Mergers between US Banks evolved during 1980-2019. 
We can observe that failures increase during the S&L crisis and the Recession of 2008. 
Mergers substantially increase from 1980 to 1998 and shortly again after 2009. These 
trends indicate that the two crises forced banks to merge to avoid failures during the 
S&L crisis and to avoid compliance costs after the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The period 
of low merger activity during the mid-1990s points out to a consolidated banking 
industry that does not present many opportunities for mergers. This period indicates 
that the process of deregulation that started after 1980 led to a substantial 
consolidation and competition of the sector, rendering difficult the entries of new 
banks into the sector. 
Figure 2: USA, Bank Failures Vs Mergers (1980-2019) (Source:FDIC) 
   
 
 
 
Figure 3 analyzes the decline of the number of banks in terms of Asset groups. 
The sector during this period has consolidated around a few major players. This 
situation is distinct in figure 3 and Figure 4. We can observe that after 1999 the 
number of small-medium banks is decreasing. 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of US Banking Institutions by Asset Group (1999-2019) (Source:FDIC) 
Figure 4: Asset Share of US Banking Industry (1999-2019) (Source:FDIC) 
 
   
Figure 4 breaks down the allocation of market share between different Bank groups. 
In parallel, with the decline of small-medium banks evident in Figure 3, we observe 
that the majority of the market share in assets accumulated in bigger banks. The 
tendencies in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 collectively suggest that from 1970 to 2018, the 
banking industry experienced consolidation of the industry around a few major 
players. 
 
 
Figure 5: US Banks, Structure of Assets (1980-2019) (Source: FDIC) 
 
Figure 5 depicts the Structure of the Asset side of the Balance Sheet of US Large banks. 
We can observe that it is mostly composed of loans and investment securities. After 
2008, we can notice that cash and due from deposits substantially increase. This fact 
can be attributed to the capital requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
   
 
Figure 6: US Banks, Structure of Loans (1980-2019) (Source: FDIC) 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates the different types of loans that are included in the bank’s 
portfolio.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: US Banks, Liabilities vs Equity (1980-2019) (Source: FDIC) 
 
Figure 7 compares the size of Liabilities and Equity Capital for US Banks. 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 8 compares Interest Income with Interest Expense for US Banks 
 
Figure 9 compares Non-Interest Income with Non-Interest Expense for US Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: US Banks, Interest Income Vs Expense (1980-2019) (Source: FDIC) 
 
Figure 9: US Banks, Non-Interest Income Vs Expense (1980-2019) (Source: FDIC) 
 
   
3.3. Data and Sampling 
This study is based on a sample of 118 banks that constitute the larger US Banks in 
2018. The inclusion of banks in the sample was based on the following criteria. First, in 
terms of specialization, I have opted to include only Bank-Holding companies to 
eliminate duplicates and incorporate numbers that represent the full range of their 
activities. Second, in terms of Size, I have opted for banks that hold more than 10 
billion Assets. This number initially constituted the threshold of Dodd-Frank Act that 
subjected these banks to rigorous regulatory oversights and stress testing to reduce 
systemic risk. When banks exceed this threshold, their compliance costs substantially 
increase, and as a result, their profitability can be adversely affected. Lastly, I have 
opted for Listed companies to examine the effect of complementarity or 
substitutability between bank-based and market-based financing.  
 
The financial data has been mostly obtained through the Bankscope database. The 
timespan and the Scope of the sample are revolving around the period of 20 years 
(1999-2018) to investigate how catalysts like the Deregulation, Recession of 2008, and 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 impacted the profitability of US major banks. The 
Bankscope database has provided most of the data used for the Bank-specific 
variables. Additionally, data for the Industry-specific, Macroeconomic variables and 
Graphs has been obtained through official US and Global databases such as the FDIC, 
FRED, World Bank, Thomson Reuters Eikon and OECD. The author has proceeded in 
relevant calculations, combinations, and adjustments of specific variables where 
needed in order to include those variables in the model effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
3.4. Methodology 
In regards to the Econometric model in line with the extant literature, I have opted for 
panel analysis. A panel regression model is apt to deal with a sample that is composed 
of cross-sectional and time-series data. According to (Baltagi, 2005), the value of 
utilizing such a model lies to the fact that it takes into consideration unobservable 
heterogeneity by incorporating individual-specific variables. In addition, the model 
offers increased variability, degrees of freedom, efficiency while reducing collinearity 
among variables.  When examining this data, the tendency in literature is to employ 
Fixed or Random Effects models.  
 
The fixed-effect model accounts for more observations, and it specifically focuses on 
the effect of time-varying variables on the Dependent variables. Each entity is assumed 
to present its specific characteristics that can potentially influence the Dependent 
variables. The fixed-effect model uncovers these relationships. The time-invariant 
characteristics are assumed to be unique and thus uncorrelated with other individual 
characteristics and are explored through the intercept, also known as a fixed effect 
(Hill et al., 2012; Baltagi, 2012). From the other side, the Random effects model 
considers the variation between model parameters as random and uncorrelated. It 
uses a different pool of populations to infer results from and allows for time-invariant 
characteristics. The decision to use a fixed or random-effects model is derived through 
the use of a specialized test known as Hausman that mostly tests whether the different 
error terms are correlated with the regressors. 
 
As far as my methodology is concerned, I transformed my dataset to Panel, and I have 
concluded through various tests that the Fixed effects model is the second most 
suitable method for my dataset. The specifics of my methodology and the results of 
the tests will be discussed in the respective section. For all relevant regressions and 
tests, the specialized statistical software of Stata has been used. The following sections 
will briefly analyze the specified model and the variables used along with their 
expected effects. 
 
 
   
3.5. Model Specification 
 
Based on Torres-Reyna, O. (2007) a conventional fixed effects model with entity and 
time effects is specified: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1X1it +…+ βkXkit + γ2E2 +…+ γnEn + δ2T2 +…+ δtTt + uit  
 
Where 
 
–Yit is the dependent variable (DV) where i = entity and t = time. 
 
–Xkit represents independent variables (IV) 
 
–βk is the coefficient for the IVs, 
 
–uit is the error term 
 
–En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies), we have n-1 entities included in the 
model. 
 
–γ2 is the coefficient for the binary regressors (entities). 
 
–Tt is time as a binary variable (dummy), so we have t-1 time periods. 
 
–δ t is the coefficient for the binary time regressors. 
 
 
For instance, the applied model in this study would be transformed as follows: 
 
ROAit = β0 + β1Bspecit + β1Indspecit + β1Macroit + γ2E2+ γnEn + δ2T2 + δtTt + uit 
 
– Yit is the dependent variable (ROA or ROE or NIM) where i = entity and t = time. 
 
– β1Bspecit represents a vector of Bank-specific variables 
 
– β2Indspecit represents a vector of Industry-specific variables 
 
– β3Macroit represents a vector of Macroeconomic variables 
 
 
 
 
 
   
3.6. Bank-specific variables 
 
Asset Quality 
 
 The quality of the Assets significantly concerns executives as Loans constitute the 
majority of a bank’s Balance Sheet, and they represent the primary source of Interest 
Income. Subsequently, an increased amount of NPL’s can create a pool of liabilities 
that do not produce cash flows, forcing banks to trigger procedures such as Charge-
offs, Write-offs, Recoveries, and Foreclosures. In turn, administrative costs increase 
and income is diminished. Additionally, the bad quality of Assets can result in credit 
rating downgrades that hurt the reputation of banks and force them to restrict future 
credit supply. Rising amounts of NPL’s can affect the economy and vice versa.  
 
Asset Structure 
 
The rationale behind Asset Structure is relatively akin to that of Asset Quality. More 
specifically, the profitability and the solvency of banks rely on effectively and 
efficiently organizing its structure in terms of Assets and Liabilities. It is reasonably safe 
to assume that through holding a larger amount of loans and investments, banks can 
produce higher returns. However, a strategy of overinvesting into income-earning 
assets can be in detriment of repaying depositors and also involves increased credit 
risk. In this context managing and holding sufficient liquidity for safety purposes is of 
paramount importance. Thus, this balance in Structure between holding loans and 
retaining Liquidity can significantly determine the profitability of banks. 
 
Capital Strength 
 
The degree of Capital strength is another critical factor that can determine the 
profitability of a bank. It can be assumed that well-capitalized banks benefit from 
increased creditworthiness and lower risk of funding, thus lower cost of capital 
(Athanasoglou, 2008). Furthermore, increased Equity Capital can signal strong stability 
and the ability to safeguard deposits (Ghosh, 2016; Berger, 1995).  
   
In turn, those banks can attract more deposits and capitalize on favorable 
circumstances in markets to improve their profitability margins (Bourke 1989; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; Goddard et al. 2004.). Lastly, capital adequacy can 
act as a cushion that can be critical in absorbing crises and shocks, especially for larger 
banks (Aebi et al. 2012). 
 
Credit Risk 
 
According to Adelopo, Lloydking, and Tauringana (2017), banks experience Credit Risk 
in two cases: when the default risk on loans is high and when they are prone to bank 
runs due to lack of reserves or insolvency issues during credit crunches. The effect of 
these cases is similar to that of Asset Quality, but in this case, as I use the loan loss 
reserves as a proxy of the credit risk, it can be inferred that those non-interesting 
bearing reserves represent a type of indirect tax. In particular, as banks are forced to 
hold an amount of cash for emergency purposes, this amount acts as a stationary idle 
“contra asset” that cannot be utilized for-profits, thus drag down profitability. Finally, a 
high amount of loan loss reserves can negatively affect the credit rating of a bank. 
 
Deposits 
 
Deposits constitute a major source of Stable Funding that banks use to support the 
origination and distribution of loans. Attracting demand for deposits can lead to 
increased market opportunities but also to agency problems that arise from the 
insurance provided by the federal government that essentially can induce moral 
hazard (Berger, 1995). Moreover, deposits are associated with the Asset Structure, and 
Asset Quality of banks as these factors determine whether the bank can effectively 
transform the deposit Liabilities to Income Earning Assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Efficiency 
 
Efficiency in banking generally refers to better managing the operating expenses to 
improve quality and speed of service, internal processes, and boosting profits. On the 
topic of operating expenses, the literature suggests that increased efficiency requires 
better management; thus, a higher cost is incurred. Additional financial resources are 
needed to attract superior experienced executives and to invest in “change” most 
likely through high-cost investments in technology. However, another explanation 
suggests that banks are capable of shifting costs to customers through low deposit 
rates, high loan rates, and servicing fees. 
 
Liquidity 
 
The Effect of Liquidity on profitability can be ambiguous. On the one hand, the careless 
management of liquidity can lead to bankruptcy exposure (Moyer et al., 2005). On the 
other hand, holding excessive levels of liquidity can indicate the absence of growth 
opportunities and the inefficient use of capital. 
 
Size 
 
The size of banks is a factor that has been extensively explored in the literature, and 
the results are quite unclear and ambiguous. On the one side, proponents of the 
positive effect (Short,1979; Smirlock 1985; Miller and Noulas, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2000; Bikker and Hu, 2002 and Goddard et al. 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 
2008) suggest that larger banks are better capitalized and through this lower cost and 
risk of their capital they improve profitability margins. Additionally, larger banks 
manage to achieve an increased degree of diversification in their product and loan 
portfolios that, in turn, boost their profitability (Smirlock, 1985). Lastly, through their 
expansionary and technological investments, their geographic reach, their extensive 
clientele, and their interconnection with financial markets, larger banks develop 
asymmetric information advantages. Overall, these factors suggest benefits from 
economies of scale.  
 
   
From the other side, the opposing view (Berger, 1987; Molyneux and Thornton 1992) 
suggests that size creates diseconomies of scale effects for larger banks. The higher 
cost of expansion through branching and the increased operating, bureaucratic, and 
compliance costs, especially after the Dodd-Frank Act, drag down profitability. 
 
Reputation 
 
The Reputation of banks is an underused factor as it is relatively tricky to incorporate it 
as a variable in regressions quantitatively. I opted for a proxy using the logarithm of 
Goodwill. The years of the bank’s activity, the stock market prices, and the credit 
ratings could be alternatively used as proxies. The rationale for this choice can be 
traced to the concept of persistence (Berger, 2006). According to Goddard et al., 2004 
and Memmel and Raupach, 2010 this persistence in profits can be attributed to 
“competitive barriers to entry, regulatory capital requirements, informational opacity 
and sensitivity to external shocks given serial correlation among them.” 
 
Diversification 
 
The rationale behind the choice of diversification is based on the view of Albertazzi, 
Gambacorta (2006) that suggest that “structural changes such as the deregulation, 
financial innovation, and new information technologies reinforced the importance of 
fee-income generating activities.” 
 
Systemic Risk 
 
In the aftermath of the Recession of 2008, the scope of regulation has shifted towards 
macro-prudential regulation that aims to reduce systemic risk in banking.  
During the Recession of 2008, a particularly alarming situation occurred when banks 
found themselves trapped in an interbank credit crunch. Thus, interbank exposure 
serves as a proxy for measuring the systemic risk of large banks and how those 
exposures affect their profitability. 
 
 
 
   
3.7. Industry-specific variables 
Concentration 
 
Concentration is another variable that is closely associated with Size and has created 
confusion among academics as the effect is also quite ambiguous. The debate among 
academics revolves around two significant hypotheses, namely the Market-Power 
(MP) hypothesis also known as the Structural-Conduct-Performance hypothesis (SCP) 
and the Efficient-Structure(ES) hypothesis. On the one hand, the MP hypothesis 
suggests that firms with substantial market power dynamics can generate 
monopolistic profits. A particular case of MP known as Relative-Market-Power (RMP) 
suggests that only firms with increased market share and a high degree of product 
differentiation can entrench their position and earn those monopolistic profits.  
 
On the other hand, the X-efficiency version of the ES (ESX) hypothesis suggests that 
improved efficiency in terms of superior management and scale benefits can result in 
heightened concentration and subsequently to bigger profits. In regards to the effect 
of concentration, the literature presents mixed findings (Smirlock, 1985; Bourke, 1989; 
Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Berger, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Mamatzakis and Remoundos, 2003; Staikouras and Wood, 2004). For this study, I used 
the 5 bank concentration as a proxy, but given the results from Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index that indicate that competition is evident in the US Banking industry, I expect the 
effect to be negative. 
 
Market Capitalization to GDP 
 
An intensified stock market development expands the informational advantages of 
large banks in a way that enables them to attract additional business, better monitor 
customers, and improve their profitability margins.  This variable intends to examine 
whether the depth of financial markets and the disintermediation process that is 
evident after 1980 compete with bank financing., Essentially, the focus is on exploring 
the relationship between bank-based and market-based financing in terms of 
Complementarity or Substitutability hypotheses. 
 
   
 
Stock Market Volatility 
 
According to the dealership model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and Angbazo (1997), the 
interest on loans is more dependent on volatility rather than on deposits. The rationale 
behind this view is based on the fact that during periods of high uncertainty, e.g. 
shocks, crises the transaction volumes in financial markets tend to multiply. For 
instance, we can observe demand for financial derivatives for hedging purposes or 
stocks sell-offs. 
 
Bank Lending to GDP 
 
This variable captures the importance of bank-financing in the economy. A low level 
can show strong signs of disintermediation and market-oriented financing. 
Additionally, if the contribution is high, we could expect intensified competition in the 
industry. 
 
Bank Assets to GDP 
 
This is another variable that captures the overall level of banking development. A high 
ratio can again showcase interbank rivalry in advanced financial markets hence a 
negative impact on profitability. 
 
Bank Assets to Market Capitalization. 
 
This variable suggests that banks and markets can either be complements or 
substitutes in terms of debt or equity financing. The level of this ratio can showcase 
whether the economy is market-based or bank-based. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Capital Adequacy 
This variable differs from Capital Strength since it takes into account the overall level 
of risk-based capital factors that were introduced after 2010 with the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Data for regulatory capital ratios of individual units is only available 
after 2010, so I use this as a generic proxy to measure the effect of regulatory capital 
on profitability. 
Productivity 
 
This variable is used to measure the contribution of labor productivity on the Net 
Income of banks. As banks follow the pace of financial innovation, their workforce 
needs to employ best practices and specialized knowledge to add value continually. 
Banks that manage to accomplish this objective and use their workforce as a 
competitive advantage can potentially earn bigger profits. 
 
Tax 
 
Regarding the effect of Corporate Tax Rate on profitability Ash Demirgiic, -Kunt and 
Harry Huizinga (1998) claim that it has an adverse effect on a bank’s saving and 
investment decisions and decreases their profitability. Albertazzi and Gambacorta 
(2009) support that banks can transfer their tax burdens to customers through the 
levels of deposit, lending, and fee rates. 
 
Deregulation 
 
The effect of Deregulation has been extensively analyzed in the literature review. As a 
proxy, I use a dummy variable. The value of 0 accounts for the years of Deregulation in 
the banking industry, whereas the value of 1 accounts for the years of Regulation. 
 
Crisis 
 
Likewise, a dummy variable is used for the effect of the crisis. The value of 0 accounts 
for standard years and the value of 1 for the crisis. 
 
 
   
3.8. Macroeconomic variables 
  
Real GDP 
 
The use of Real GDP examines whether the bank profits are of procyclical or 
countercyclical nature. An increase in GDP potentially brings about an increase in 
consumer and business spending hence increased opportunities for credit supply. 
Alternatively, GDP growth can potentially signify interbank competition. 
 
Inflation 
 
According to Revell (1979) and Perry (1992), the effect of inflation on banks is 
dependent on whether banks can accurately anticipate and forecast its level. The 
banks that act swiftly are capable of proceeding to necessary adjustments to the levels 
of their interest rates, so those will exceed the increases in their operating costs and 
hence lead to higher profits. Furthermore, inflation is considered to be associated with 
larger volumes of transactions. 
 
Money Market Rate 
 
As short-term rates increase, we can expect that the cost of borrowing for banks also 
increases. Moreover, for customers, the current and future lending possibility, the 
default probability, and the ability to repay outstanding debt turn into burdensome. 
 
Long-Term Rate 
 
The long-term rate can positively impact profitability as banks can benefit from the 
spread between short-term and long-term rates as they primarily engage in maturity 
transformation activities. Moreover, the long term rates depict future business cycle 
expectations, and if those are optimistic, banks can reduce their provision levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Prime Rate 
 
The use of the Prime Rate can shed light on the effect of the Federal Funds Rate on the 
profitability of banks. The Prime Rate, which is primarily determined by the Federal 
Funds Rate, is the rate that banks charge their most creditworthy customers and also 
serves as the benchmark rate for a variety of other bank rates.  Therefore, a rising 
Prime Rate can influence the whole spectrum of bank’s activities and generate higher 
profitability.  
 
Unemployment 
 
The Effect of Unemployment on bank's profitability is linked with inflation. As those 
two are inversely correlated in periods of high unemployment, banks do not need to 
increase wages, whereas, in periods of low unemployment, they need to increase the 
wages to attract the best employees. However, the level of unemployment can also 
serve as an indicator of future economic expectations; thus, high unemployment can 
coincide with recessions in which the activities of banks decrease and hence their 
profitability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 1: Variables, Notations, Proxies& Expected effects 
Category Variable Notation Proxy 
Expected 
effect 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
 
Return on Assets ROA Net Income/Average Total Assets  
Return on Equity ROE Net Income/Average Total Equity  
Net Interest 
Margin 
NIM 
Interest Income-Interest Expenses/ 
Average Earning  Assets 
 
B
an
k-
sp
ec
if
ic
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Asset Quality ASSETQ NPL/Gross Loans - 
Asset Structure ASSETST Net Loans/Total Assets + 
Capital Strength CAPSTR Equity/Total Assets + 
Credit Risk CRED Loan Loss Reserves/Gross Loans - 
Deposits DEP Deposits/Total Assets + 
Efficiency EFFIC Cost/Income - 
Liquidity LIQ Liquid Assets/Deposits & Stable Funding - 
Size SIZE Natural Logarithm of Total Assets - 
Reputation REP Natural Logarithm of Goodwill + 
Diversification DIVERSF Non-Interest Income/Operating Revenues + 
Systemic Risk SYSTEMR Interbank Assets/Interbank Liabilities - 
In
d
u
st
ry
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Concentration CONC 5-Bank Asset Concentration - 
Market Cap to 
GDP 
MCGDP Market Capitalization/GDP + 
Stock Market 
Volatility 
SMVOL CBOE Volatility Index: VIX - 
Bank Lending to 
GDP 
BLGDP Domestic Credit to Private Sector/GDP - 
Bank Assets to 
GDP 
BAGDP Bank Assets /GDP - 
Bank Assets to 
Market Cap 
BAMC Bank Assets /Market Capitalization - 
Capital 
Adequacy 
CAD Regulatory Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets - 
Productivity PROD Net Income/Number of Employees + 
Tax TAX Tax/Pre-tax Profits - 
Deregulation DEREG Dummy variable 0,1 + 
Financial Crisis CRISIS Dummy variable 0,1 - 
M
ac
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s Real GDP RGDP Real GDP ,Growth Annual % + 
Inflation INFL Inflation, consumer prices Annual % + 
Money Market 
Rate 
MONMR 
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market 
Rate,  Annual % 
- 
Long Term Rate LTR 
Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-
year  Annual % 
+ 
Prime Rate PRIMR Bank Prime Loan Rate,  Annual % + 
Unemployment UNEMPL Unemployment Rate,  Annual % - 
   
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The following table depicts Descriptive Statistics for the sample of the study. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                              
      UNEMPL        0.06      0.02      0.04      0.10      0.00      0.91      2.57   2360.00
       PRIMR        0.05      0.02      0.03      0.09      0.00      0.85      2.28   2360.00
       FEDFR        0.02      0.02      0.00      0.06      0.00      0.96      2.51   2360.00
         LTR        0.04      0.01      0.02      0.06      0.00      0.41      2.25   2360.00
       MONMR        0.02      0.02      0.00      0.06      0.00      0.95      2.57   2360.00
        INFL        0.02      0.01     -0.00      0.04      0.00     -0.72      3.15   2360.00
        RGDP        0.02      0.03     -0.08      0.07      0.00     -2.04      8.82   2360.00
      CRISIS        0.20      0.40      0.00      1.00      0.16      1.50      3.25   2360.00
       DEREG        0.55      0.50      0.00      1.00      0.25     -0.20      1.04   2360.00
         TAX        0.28      0.83    -25.38      9.78      0.69    -16.42    593.71   1605.00
        PROD        0.08      0.38     -2.41     11.35      0.15     22.45    612.71   1851.00
         CAD        0.11      0.01      0.08      0.13      0.00     -0.25      1.73   2360.00
        BAMC        0.59      0.15      0.39      1.05      0.02      1.41      5.09   2360.00
       BAGDP        0.74      0.10      0.56      0.84      0.01     -0.44      1.58   2360.00
       BLGDP        0.52      0.03      0.47      0.60      0.00      0.92      3.15   2360.00
       SMVOL        0.10      0.45     -0.46      1.30      0.20      1.25      3.82   2360.00
       MCGDP        1.30      0.21      0.79      1.65      0.04     -0.70      2.81   2360.00
        CONC        0.41      0.07      0.28      0.48      0.01     -0.77      1.94   2360.00
     SYSTEMR        1.29      1.86      0.00      9.97      3.47      2.18      7.92   1481.00
     DIVERSF        0.33      0.22     -0.99      2.04      0.05      1.17      7.24   1863.00
         REP       12.57      2.26      2.89     18.27      5.09     -0.24      4.07   1743.00
        SIZE        7.27      0.76      5.38      9.53      0.58      0.74      3.56   1864.00
         LIQ        0.16      0.46      0.00      7.67      0.21      9.07    114.08   1843.00
       EFFIC        0.63      0.14      0.08      2.07      0.02      1.22     15.67   1857.00
         DEP        0.80      0.36      0.00      7.16      0.13      7.82    113.06   1827.00
        CRED        0.01      0.01      0.00      0.13      0.00      4.70     40.83   1837.00
      CAPSTR        0.11      0.05     -0.00      0.85      0.00      7.48     87.43   1864.00
     ASSETST        0.62      0.17      0.00      0.95      0.03     -1.50      5.51   1848.00
      ASSETQ        0.02      0.02      0.00      0.41      0.00      7.67    105.04   1785.00
         NIM        3.65      1.69     -4.50     20.68      2.86      3.87     35.39   1858.00
         ROE       11.97     32.84    -96.17    998.89   1078.23     19.08    489.06   1861.00
         ROA        1.05      1.11    -15.04     15.19      1.24      1.74     74.08   1864.00
                                                                                              
    variable        mean        sd       min       max  variance  skewness  kurtosis         N
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
   
According to Table 2 for the banks of our sample, the mean of ROA is 1.05, of ROE 
11.97, and NIM 3.65. ROA and NIM do not present large standard deviations (1.11 and 
1.69) ROE exhibits a large standard deviation of 32.84. The minimum ROA is -15.04, 
and the maximum is 15.19. The minimum ROE is -96.17 and the maximum ROE is 
998.89. Minimum NIM is -4.50 and the maximum NIM is 20.68. The independent 
variables generally have low mean values with low standard deviations. The number of 
observations for profitability measures and bank-specific variables varies from 1481 to 
1864. The Industry-specific and Macroeconomic variables are fixed at 2360 
observations as they are repeated values across years with the exceptions of 
Productivity and Tax that have been calculated for every individual bank based on 
available data. 
 
 
   
4.2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 presents the Correlation Matrix for the variables used in our model. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
   
Table 3 indicates that there are signs of moderate and high correlation across variables 
in the model. According to the numbers, I decided to exclude the variable FEDFR 
(Federal Funds Rate) from the model due to an almost perfect correlation. I proceeded 
with no additional exclusions. 
 
4.3. Robustness tests 
 
To begin with, given the longitudinal nature of the sample, the initial approach was 
based on undertaking pooled OLS regressions. The dataset has been transformed into 
the appropriate “long-form” in order to conduct panel data analysis. I proceeded with 
producing reports about the description, summary, and the correlation matrix of the 
variables. Next, I performed pooled OLS regressions and several tests to determine 
whether the method of pooled OLS regressions is suitable for the sample.  
 
Firstly, I accounted for heteroscedasticity through the use of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test (estat hettest). The results pointed towards the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, thus suggesting the use of robust errors. Second, I accounted for 
omitted variables through the use of the Ramsey Reset test. The results suggested that 
there are omitted variables. Third, I accounted for model specification through the use 
of the linktest. The results suggested that the model is not correctly specified. 
 
Fourth, I determined whether the use of a pooled OLS or a random-effects model is 
appropriate for my sample through the use of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The 
results suggested that a random-effects model is more appropriate and rendered the 
results of the pooled OLS biased. Fifth, I determined whether the use of fixed effects or 
random-effects model is more appropriate by using the Hausman test. The results of 
the Hausman test returned a negative value, so no results could not be inferred from 
its use. I proceeded with estimating a Hausman test with the sigmamore option and a 
robust Hausman test. Both results suggested that the use of a fixed-effects model is 
appropriate. I proceeded with estimating a fixed effects model using clustering to 
account for entity effects and heteroscedasticity. Then I used the testparm test to 
determine whether the incorporation of time effects is needed. The results suggested 
that time effects need to be incorporated into the model. 
   
 Given the results of the tests as mentioned earlier, I concluded that the use of a fixed 
model with entity and time effects is the most suitable, and this model was used to 
derive results from. Following these results, I used the Modified Wald Test to 
investigate the presence of Groupwise heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation. The results suggested that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are 
evident in the model. Given the presence of these parameters, the results of the 
regression should be interpreted with relative caution. As mentioned in the section of 
limitations a more efficient and suitable way to derive precise results would be to 
employ Dynamic panel data regression through the System GMM method (Arellano, 
Bover/ Blundell-Bond estimation). Finally, I have used a unit root test to account for 
stationarity. According to results, stationarity exists. 
4.4. Limitations 
 
This dissertation is subject to several limitations. First, the scope of study only 
investigates the case of the United States and does not take into consideration other 
countries; hence, it does not account for cross-sectional country differences and global 
effects. Second, the model should be interpreted with caution as specific parameters 
influence the results. The approach of examining micro panels by utilizing fixed-effect 
models suffers from some conventional limitations. 
 
 In particular, the data has not undergone winsorization and standardization.  
Further, the presence of group-wise heteroscedasticity indicates inconsistency and 
imprecision. The serial correlation suggests that the statistical significance of 
regressors coefficients is not entirely reliable.  Endogeneity constitutes another 
apparent limitation that is a significant concern in this kind of study as it signals that 
the model is subject to omitted variable, simultaneity, selection, measurement error, 
and functional form misspecification bias. The most appropriate way to correct these 
issues and study this sample would be to employ a dynamic panel data model known 
as System Generalized Method of Moments(GMM). Finally, the sample is relatively 
narrow, and it could be further extended to incorporate small and medium-sized 
banks. 
   
4.5. Regression results 
 
Table 4 reports the empirical results of the specified model that utilizes ROA, ROE, and 
NIM as profitability variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression results. ROA, ROE, NIM 
   
Starting with ROA on bank-specific variables, we observe that Capital Strength is 
significant and positively related to ROA. This finding is consistent with Bourke (1989), 
Berger,1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Abreu and Mendes (2002), 
Staikouras and Wood, 2003; Goddard et al. (2004), Naceur and Goaied (2001, 2008) 
Stiroh and Rumble, 2006 and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and García-Herrero et al. 
(2009). This finding shows that well-capitalized banks present higher profitability due 
to benefits derived from increased market opportunities, creditworthiness, lower cost 
of funding, and endurance to crises.  
Next, Credit Risk is found to be negatively and significantly related to ROA in line with 
Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Miller and Noulas (1997), and 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Banks that hold excessive capital for their Loan Loss 
Reserves deprive themselves of opportunities to profit through utilizing this cash to 
engage in additional loans and investment activities.  
 
In regards to Size, the effect is negative and significant, demonstrating that large banks 
experience diseconomies of scale effects. This result is in line with the findings of 
Berger et al., 1987; Goddard et al. 2004; Micco et al., 2007 Ben and Goaied, 2010; 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014) Then, we find that Diversification has a significant 
positive impact on ROA. This result proves that after 1980, the importance of non-
interest income generated through fees and other forms of service for banks 
substantially augmented. Banks are relying more and more on these activities to 
generate additional income as the interest income is suffering from a low-interest-rate 
environment. However, the Dodd-Frank Act has imposed stringent regulation on non-
interest income activities.  
 
Another variable that is found to be negatively and significantly correlated with ROA is 
Systemic Risk. In particular, this variable is measured by the level of interbank 
exposure. The results suggest that the profitability of banks is dragged down by 
excessive interbank liabilities. Potentially, excessive interbank liabilities can be 
attributed to a lack of capital to fill in mandatory reserves, diversification purposes, 
and over engaging in overnight repo transactions. The implications can be quite severe 
as banks might face regulatory scrutiny, trust issues, and distress concerns.  
   
Turning to the Industry-specific variables, we find evidence that Concentration has a 
negative and significant effect on ROA. This negative relationship is in line with the 
findings of Berger (1995), Boone, J., Weigand, J., 2000 Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and 
Delis (2005) and Ameur and Mhiri (2013). This result demonstrates that competition 
significantly restrains the profitability margins as banks compete to grasp market 
share. Notably, in the case of the US, a handful of large banks accumulate the majority 
of the market share; hence, the degree of competition is very intense.  
 
Further, we find that Market Capitalization to GDP has a significant negative 
relationship with ROA in line with Ash Demirgiic, -Kunt, and Harry Huizinga (1999). This 
result suggests that when the economy experiences disintermediation, meaning that 
market-based financing is more dominant, banks lose opportunities. This finding seems 
to verify the Miller-Modigliani theorem of substitutability hypothesis and implies that 
the informational advantages that large banks might derive from a strong stock market 
development are subject to limitations.   
 
Referring to Bank Assets to GDP, there is a significant positive relationship with ROA. 
This finding hints that as large banks increase the size of their income-earning asset 
portfolio, they can establish their position and boost their profits. More specifically, 
when the overall amount of assets managed by banks is gradually growing, this 
tendency points to a booming economy. A booming economy brings about increased 
demand for credit supply and banking products.  
 
The relationship between Bank Assets and Market Capitalization is reported as 
negative and significant in line with Ash Demirgiic, -Kunt, and Harry Huizinga (1999) 
and suggests substitutability hypothesis. This result demonstrates that the excessive 
growth of the banking industry can be a detriment to profitability margins. As banks 
accumulate assets, the operating costs increase, and a deteriorating quality of these 
assets in terms of overvaluation or illiquidity can prove to be problematic. Also, the 
development of intense interbank competition can influence margins. In an optimal 
setting, a strong stock market development represents a prosperous real economy 
that immensely contributes to the overall economic growth.  
   
We also find evidence that Productivity positively and significantly affects ROA. The 
banks that effectively and efficiently utilize their workforce can earn higher profits. 
Finally, in regards to the effects of Deregulation and Crisis, we find that they have 
positive and negative significant relationships, respectively. These findings coincide 
with the literature review and demonstrate that deregulation enables the banking 
sector to magnify in size and generate exorbitant profits. On the other side, a crisis 
puts a handbrake on these momentums and weakens the profitability of the sector. 
 
In regards to the results of ROE, we observe three differences. First, the effect of 
Capital Strength on ROE is negative and significant. This finding is consistent with the 
efficiency-risk hypothesis proposed by Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). The 
hypothesis associates higher leverage or lower equity with higher profit efficiency and 
higher returns. In turn, those returns substitute equity capital and protect firms from 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs.  
On the other side, high levels of equity capital in banks affect the risk-taking behavior 
of its management. In particular, an equity-based capital structure prompts the bank’s 
executives to showcase risk-averse behavior. As the available capital stems from 
shareholders, it is becoming more difficult for managers to engage in riskier activities 
that generate higher returns due to fear of failure and loss. The higher levels of equity 
support the franchise-value hypothesis in which economic rents have to be protected 
against the danger of liquidation. In other words, more efficient firms choose to retain 
high levels of equity to safeguard franchise value.  
 
 Second, Inflation is found to be positively and significantly associated with ROE in line 
with Bourke, 1989; Claessens et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, 
Molyneux and Thornton,1992, Guru, Staunton and Balashanmugam (2002), 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2005), Flamini et al. (2009), Ahokpossi (2013), 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014). This finding is consistent with the idea that banks that 
proceed to swift adjustments to combat inflation changes can generate higher profits. 
Lastly, the relationship between ROE and Prime Rate is positive and significant, 
indicating that a hike in the Prime Rate affects all rates charged by banks in a way that 
increases spreads and boosts profits. 
   
Finally, turning to NIM, we observe some differentiation as well. To begin with, NIM is 
positively and significantly influenced by Asset Quality. This result contradicts the 
initial expectation as we would expect a rising NPL level to erode profitability. The 
result is only significant at a 95% confidence interval and hints that our model is 
potentially not correctly specified. Further, we find evidence that Asset Structure has a 
significant positive effect on NIM. This result is rational because as the number of 
Loans increases, banks can accumulate more interest payments. 
  
Next, we find that Diversification is negatively and significantly related to NIM. This 
finding is expected as profitable non-interest income activities would reduce the 
profitability of interest-income activities. Concerning the effect of Bank Lending to GDP 
on NIM, it is negative and significant in line with Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Harry 
Huizinga (1999), highlighting that as demand for credit heightens vigorous interbank 
competition emerges. The effect of Tax on NIM is positive and significant in line with 
Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Harry Huizinga (1999), implying that banks can shift tax 
burdens to their customers through the level of their rates. 
  
Next, the effect of Real GDP on NIM is negative and significant in line with Staikouras 
and Wood (2003), suggesting that in developed countries, interbank competition 
intensifies and reduces profits and interest margins. Finally, we observe that the effect 
of the Money Market Rate on NIM is negative and significant. This finding is consistent 
with the financial instability hypothesis (Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1975;1982; 
Kindleberger, 1978). The result potentially indicates that short-term rate hikes increase 
the short term funding cost of banks. Also, the outstanding debt payments and default 
risk of borrowers heighten along with their ability to further lend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
5. Conclusions 
 
 
This dissertation at first aimed at providing a holistic view of the periods of 
Deregulation, the Recession of 2008, and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. This 
has been made possible through the use of a comprehensive literature review that 
combined theoretical and empirical arguments from a historical and economic 
perspective. In regards to the first research question, the literature review suggests 
that the extensive deregulation in the US Banking industry after 1980 significantly 
transformed the industry and intensified the interbank competition as banks engaged 
in an endless race to earn exorbitant profits. Along with deregulation, changes in 
demand and technology contributed to this large-scale transformation of the banking 
industry. Market shares accumulated to the largest banks as the sector significantly 
consolidated. The primary vehicles that banks exploited to generate profits were 
mortgages, derivatives, risk, and leverage. Perverse incentives evident in banking, 
regulatory and credit rating institutions allowed the exploitation of leverage to pursue 
exorbitant profits. This protracted period of careless lending resulted in the creation of 
a huge bubble. The bubble was the harbinger of great upheavals that materialized with 
the Recession of 2008 that put an end to this rampant growth of the banking industry 
and shook the foundations of the global economic system.  
 
In the aftermath of the Recession, the Federal Government and the regulatory 
agencies placed their emphasis on addressing future systemic risk concerns by 
enacting the comprehensive financial overhaul “Dodd-Frank Act.” In regards to the 
third research question, this gigantic piece of legislation imposed strict restrictions on 
the bank’s activities. The main focus was given on strengthening capital reserves, 
performing frequent stress tests, and adopting a macroprudential approach. 
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act limited the non-interest income activities of banks. 
The effect of the legislation has raised many doubts among groups of professionals. 
Generally, it can be inferred that significant effort has been made through Dodd-Frank 
to create large banks that are very well capitalized and oversighted. In addition, it has 
managed to limit their exposure to counterparty risk and high-risk activities.  
 
   
However, the Dodd-Frank Act has managed to achieve those objectives by loading 
those banks with huge burdens of compliance costs. The critics claim that those limits 
negatively influence the profitability and innovation of the sector. Also, those 
limitations ultimately result in increasingly consolidating the sector. As small and 
medium banks strive to survive in order to withstand the compliance costs, they need 
to engage in M&A transactions or retain the current scale of activities. This tendency 
allows the handful of players that control the industry to magnify even more in size 
and absorb market shares.  
 
In regards to the objectives of reducing systemic risk and adopting macro-prudential 
approaches, the critics claim that some of the bodies that have been created through 
the Dodd-Frank Act are effective. However, the involvement of multiple bodies in the 
process and the overlap of their jurisdictions hints at future problems of confusion and 
inefficiency during times of recessions. Lastly, an opinion among critics supports the 
idea that the inherently political nature of these bodies can allow conflicts of interests, 
lobbying, and shady agreements to affect the performance of the legislation. 
 
Moving to the empirical results and the fourth research question, this study employs 
an econometric model of Panel Regression to derive some actual results regarding the 
effects described in the literature. More specifically, a sample of 118 listed US Bank 
Holding Companies with more than 10 billion in Assets is examined. This research is 
based on the conventional studies that investigate the determinants of bank’s 
profitability. The variables used include multiple Bank-specific, Industry-specific, and 
Macroeconomic variables. The profitability measures include ROA, ROE, and NIM. The 
applied econometric model pertains to a Fixed-effects with Entity and Time effects.  
 
We find evidence that the most critical Determinants of large US bank’s profitability 
include: Capital Strength, Credit Risk, Diversification, and Productivity. Moreover, 
Deregulation is positively and significantly related to profitability in all cases. Finally, 
weak evidence occurred for some Industry-specific and Macroeconomic variables. The 
results obtained through the use of our model are subject to some severe limitations 
and hence should be interpreted with caution. 
   
The future extensions of this research could be directed towards expanding the US 
sample and including cross-sectional evidence from other markets to assess similarities 
and differences. Furthermore, additional variables that can increase explanatory 
power and cast light on causalities could be incorporated in similar models.  Moreover, 
in terms of methodology, dynamic panel data models (GMM) could increase the 
degree of the result’s efficiency. Lastly, as similar researches have been performed in 
other markets and other asset groups, the possibility of cross-comparisons for future 
researchers emerges. 
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Appendix 
The Graph Analysis at first attempts to provide support for and validation to the 
Literature Review by presenting visually relevant quantitative characteristics. 
Additionally, the Graph Analysis is utilized to lay the foundations for the Econometric 
model and link the results of the secondary data analysis with those of the primary 
data analysis. In particular, the Graph Analysis is divided into two parts, where the first 
one examines generic indicators of the US economy that can highlight the effect of the 
Recession of 2008 in the overall US economy. Second, the Structure of the US Banks is 
presented to showcase how Deregulation across time transformed the US Banking 
Sector. Third, the graphs associated with the Structure of Banks will provide a view on 
many of the variables that will be used in the Econometric Model and how those 
evolved in the period under consideration (1970-2019). Each graph section will be 
followed by brief comments, to sum up, and provide a critical examination of the 
results.  
   
Data sources: FDIC, FRED, OFR, World Bank, Bankscope, Thomson Eikon 
 
A. US Economic Indicators 
 
Figure 1: US Real GDP Growth (1980-2019) 
 
Figure 2: US Core Inflation (1980-2019) 
   
 
Figure 3: US Unemployment Rate (1970-2019) 
Figure 4: US Professional & Business Services Employment 
   
 
Figure 5:US Balance, Current Account (1970-2019) 
 
 
Figure 6: US Current Account, Imports-Exports (1970-2019) 
 
Figure 7: US Balance, Goods & Services (1970-2019) 
   
 
Figure 8: US Balance, Capital Account (1990-2019) 
 
Figure 9:  Foreign Investment in the US-US Direct Investment Abroad (1994-2019) 
 
Figure 10: Net US Incurrence of Financial Liabilities (1970-2019) 
   
 
 Figure 11: US Federal Government Surplus/Deficit  
(1970-2019) 
Figure 12: US Federal Surplus/Deficit as % of GDP  
(1970-2019) 
Figure 13: US Gross Public as % of GDP (1970-2019) Figure 14: US Total Federal Debt (1993-2019) 
   
 
Figure 15: US Total External Debt Vs. External Government Debt (2001-2019) 
 
Figure 16: US TIC, Major Foreign Holdings of Treasury Securities (2000-2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Foreign US Agency Bonds (1980-2019) Figure 18: Foreign US T-Bonds & Notes (1980-2019) 
Figure 19: Foreign US Corporate Bonds (1980-2019) Figure 20: Foreign US Corporate Stocks (1980-2019) 
   
 
Figure 21: Foreign Acquisition of US Long Term Securities (1980-2019)  
 
Figure 22: US Residents, Total purchases of Foreign Securities (1980-2019) 
 
   
 
Figure 23: US Debt, Various Debt Levels (1970-2019) 
 
 
Figure 24: US Total Commercial Paper (1996-2019) 
   
Figure 25: US Consumer Credit Outstanding (1970-2019) Figure 26: US Consumer Credit: Revolving vs Non Revolving 
(1980-2019) 
Figure 27: US Household Debt Service Ratio (1980-2019) Figure 28: US Financial Obligations Ratio (1980-2019) 
   
Figure 29: US Homeownership Vs Vacancy (1970-2019) Figure 30:  US Building Permits, House Starts, New Home Sales 
(1970-2019) 
Figure 31: US Construction Spending,  
Private Residential vs Non Residential (1990-2019) 
Figure 32: US Mortgage Originations, Refinance, Purchase 
(1990-2019) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: US Housing Debt Balance, Mortgage & Home Equity (1999-2019) 
Figure 34:  US Non Housing Debt Balance, Auto, Credit , Student , Other (1999-2019) 
Figure 35: US Mortgage Origination Volume by Fico Risk Score (1996-2019) 
   
 
Figure 36: US Total Delinquency Rates (1985-2019) 
Figure 37: US Charge-offs Rates (1985-2019) 
Figure 38: US All Loans Past Due & Foreclosures (1980-2019) 
   
Brief Comments on US indicators 
 
This first part of the Graph Analysis presents generic indicators of the US economy; 
through its examination, several observations stand out. First, during the period 
mentioned above, the US has been hit by multiple recessions (1970,1973-1975, 1980, 
1981-1982, 1990, 2000 and 2008). This short timespan between recessions has 
resulted in a volatile environment of declines and recoveries of Real GDP growth and 
unemployment. Regarding inflation, its high level during 1970-1980 can be attributed 
to oil crises, government overspending, and rising prices and wages. However, after 
1980, a generic contraction of inflation can be observed that stems from the changes 
in US monetary policy aiming to avert deflation situations.  
 
Moreover, by looking at the Current Account graphs, we can observe the actual change 
of the economic model that occurred after 1980 in the US. In particular, the 
introduction and establishment of Neoliberal Economics by Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan replaced the Keynesian model of wages and productivity. Essentially, 
the manufacturing base of the US was decomposed and gave its place to an economic 
model of knowledge work. Services, housing, and leverage constituted the driving 
forces of this model. Initially, this is reflected in Current Account Graphs as we can 
observe that approximately from 1980 the imports of USA are higher than their 
exports. As far as the US direct investment abroad and the foreign direct investment in 
the US are concerned, we can notice that in the period under consideration, they 
generally appear in par. This can be partly explained on the one hand by the 
attractiveness of US Financial Markets and on the other hand, by the outsourcing of US 
business activities towards emerging markets of lower production and wage costs such 
as China and India. 
 
In regards to the Federal Government deficit, we can observe that it is declining from 
1970 and onwards. This can be partly attributed to the use of deficit spending as a 
medium of expansionary fiscal policy to drive economic growth. The deficit is mostly 
based on military spending, tax cuts, and mandatory spending, such as Social Security 
and Medicare. Additionally, countries such as China and Japan have been traditionally 
   
major holders of Treasury Securities in order to devaluate their currencies relative to 
the dollar to fuel US-based absorption of their exports. The US has managed to hold 
deficits due to protracted low-interest-rate policies after 1980. Foreign positions on 
Treasury securities have been maintained because of a belief in the economic power of 
the US and its status as a haven for investment. The deficit doubled during the 
Recession of 2008 due to Quantitative Easing policies to fight Recession and spur 
growth. In hindsight, deficit spending created short-term economic growth through 
empowering defense, healthcare, and construction. However, the excessive deficit in 
case of declining demand for Treasuries and devaluation of the dollar can result in 
increased systemic risk and interest payments. 
 
Furthermore, we can observe the evolution of various types of debts in the US. The 
effects of the Recession of 2008 are evident in many indicators. Initially, mortgage 
originations, construction spending, delinquency rates, charge-off rates, and loans past 
due increase significantly until 2010, and then a slowdown is experienced. The same 
situation can be noticed in the level of Commercial Paper, which was the medium of 
funding the liquidity mismatch of MBS. The RICO scores of Mortgage originations after 
2010 have substantially moved towards the higher score (780+), reflecting the new 
stringent criteria for mortgages. The housing bubble and its bust are clear despite a 
recurring resurgence. The main observation that stands out is the fact that other forms 
of debt namely consumer (auto, credit, student loans) and corporate, have significantly 
risen. The systemic risk has transitioned from housing to the federal government, and 
in parallel, consumer debt is still surging through other forms along with corporate 
debt. The combination of these dynamics can make up for a gloomy economic outlook. 
   
B. Structure of US Banks 
 
Data sources: FDIC, FRED, OFR, World-Bank, Bankscope 
 
 
Figure 39: US Timeline of Major Deregulation reforms in US Banking  
   
 
Figure 40: USA, Number of Banks vs. Branches (1980-2019)  
 
 
Figure 41: USA, Bank Failures Vs. Mergers (1980-2019) 
 
   
 
Figure 42: Number of US Banking Institutions by Asset Group (1999-2019) 
 
Figure 43: Asset Share of US Banking Industry (1999-2019) 
   
Ratios 
Figure 44: US Small-Medium Banks, ROA (1999-2019) Figure 45: US Large-Banks, ROA (1999-2019) 
Figure 46: US Small-Medium Banks, ROE (1999-2019) Figure 47: US Large Banks, ROE (1999-2019) 
Figure 48: US Small-Medium Banks with Losses (1999-2019) Figure 49: US Large Banks with Losses (1999-2019) 
   
Figure 50: US Small-Medium Banks, Net Interest Margin (1999-
2019) 
Figure 51: US Large Banks, Net Interest Margin (1999-2019) 
Figure 52:US Small-Medium Banks, Efficiency Ratio (1999-
2019) 
Figure 53: US Large Banks, Efficiency Ratio (1999-2019) 
Figure 54: US Small-Medium Banks, Coverage Ratio (1999-
2019) 
Figure 55: US Large Banks, Coverage Ratio (1999-2019) 
   
 
Figure 56:US Small-Medium Banks, Leverage Ratio (1999-2019) Figure 57: US Large Banks, Leverage Ratio (1999-2019) 
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Brief Comments on the Structure of US Banks 
 
Looking at technical and ratios, we can observe that all banks have been struck by the 
Recession of 2008 and experienced significant drops to their profitability ratios (ROA, ROE). In 
terms of ROA, there is no significant difference between small-medium and large banks. 
However, in terms of ROE, we can observe that small-medium banks have recovered better 
after the recession of 2008 and present higher ROE ratios than large banks. A potential reason 
for this can be attributed to increased Compliance costs and scrutiny of Large banks stemming 
from the Dodd-Frank Act. However, when we examine the percent of banks that showcase 
quarterly losses, it is evident that small-medium banks after the recession of 2008 present 
more significant losses than large banks that present very low levels. This situation can be 
attributed to the fact that smaller banks are subjected to the same increased Compliance costs 
of the Dodd-Frank Act even though they do not necessarily hold the same amount of systemic 
risk and resources. This can also potentially explain the rise of Mergers observed after 2010 
since the viability of smaller banks is hurt from the Dodd-Frank Act; they resort to Mergers in an 
effort to reduce the impact of these costs.  
 
In terms of Net Interest Margin, Efficiency, and Coverage Ratios, we can observe that all banks 
are almost in par; however, smaller banks appear to be relatively more efficient. In terms of 
Risk capital ratios, we can observe that small-medium banks showcase relatively higher capital 
adequacy than large banks. Regarding the Structure of Balance Sheets and Income Statements, 
we can observe that for all banks, the major part of their Assets (60%) is based on Loans 
indicating a high exposure to Lending risk but high Profitability prospects as well. In terms of 
Deposits to Assets again, the Ratios are high indicating high stable sources of Funding. In terms 
of Equity Capital to Assets, we can observe that all banks hold approximately 12-13 % percent 
of Equity Capital, with the exception of huge banks that hold approximately 8-10%. The Risk-
Weighted Asset levels for all banks are almost in par around 70%+. Regarding the Maturity of 
Assets, all banks hold almost between 25% and 30% of > 5 years Assets. 
 
 
 
 
   
Following on with the Structure of Assets we can observe that the majority of Assets consists of 
Loans and Investment Securities and after the Recession of 2008 the cash positions of banks 
have increased and the trading account activities have decreased as a result of the changes 
introduced by Dodd-Frank Act (Volcker Rule). In regards to the Structure of Loans, we can 
notice that the majority is mostly comprised of Mortgages and Commercial Real Estate Loans. 
As far as the other categories are concerned, we can observe that all loans that are associated 
with Commercial, Industrial, Construction and Agricultural purposes, along with leases, have 
gradually decreased. This trend possibly indicates the transformation of the economic model of 
the US that occurred after 1980. In particular, the manufacturing base has been decomposed 
and outsourcing of business activities had been directed to Asia and the driving force of the 
economy has been centered around the housing market and leverage. However, loans that are 
associated with consumers such as credit card, auto, and student loans have significantly 
increased. Regarding the Structure of Investment securities these mostly consist of US 
government securities and Corporate Bonds. Regarding the Structure of Deposits, these mostly 
consist of non-transaction interest-bearing Saving Deposits. In regards to the levels of domestic 
loans and foreign loans, domestic loans have been increasing after 2008 and the foreign loans 
have been decreasing. The deposits have both been decreasing. The structure of Equity consists 
mostly of Surpluses and Undivided profits. Generally, we can infer that the Interest activities of 
US Banks’ are increasing despite the drop during 2008 but the Non Interest activities are less 
profitable as the expense outweighs the income. The high level of profitability in the Interest 
Income activities has not been accompanied by high levels of provisions. In addition, even 
though the Net Interest Income is substantially high, this does not translate into the same level 
of Net Income as many costs accumulate and lower the overall Net Income of banks. Another 
observation that stands out is associated with the Number of Employees and their salaries. 
Notably, we can observe an immense increase in salaries but at the same time, these salaries 
are accumulating in a gradually declining number of employees. Finally, an interesting 
observation is associated with the significant increase of Fee Income that represents the 
change in the role of banks and their activities after 1999. The Mortgage bubble is particularly 
distinctive by examining the huge increase and the subsequent drop of the Net Securitization 
income that drove the new model of Originate and Distribute that led to the Recession of 2008. 
Overall, we can notice that the total number of Assets and Liabilities has been increasing 
without being accompanied by a commensurate increase in Equity Capital. 
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